































Since a man’s reproductive success depends on his ability to outcompete other men, male com-
petitiveness may be expected to have been exposed to strong selective pressure throughout hu-
man history. Accordingly, the relatively low level of physical violence observed between men
has been viewed as a puzzle. What could have limited the eagerness of men to out-compete
each other? I study the evolution of male competitiveness in a model where men compete for
both reproductive and productive resources. I show that high levels of male competitiveness
are then consistent with evolution by natural selection if (a) the ecology is generous enough
for men to supply little or no food to their children, (b) competing is not too costly in terms of
productive resources, and (c) relatedness among males is low enough. While the main analysis
takes women to passively accept the husband that emerges from the male-male competition,
the results are qualitatively robust to allowing for female mate choice following the male-male
competition game. Possible implications for our understanding of the evolution of marriage
systems are discussed.
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1 Introduction
In a species like Homo sapiens, where fertilization and gestation take place inside women’s bodies,
a man’s reproductive success depends on the number of women he fertilizes, while a woman’s re-
productive success is limited by the number of children she can give birth to. This basic biological
fact implies that males face a more severe competition for reproductive resources than women
do. In fact, it is unclear what could limit the eagerness of males to out-compete each other, and
the relatively low levels of physical violence observed between men have been viewed as a puzzle
(Seabright, 2004).1 The theory proposed here sheds new light on this question. It centers on the
premise that a full understanding of the evolution of male-male competition requires an under-
standing of how evolution by natural selection shapes male preferences over the number of wives2
in the first place, and how these preferences affect the men’ willingness to compete against each
other. Intuitively, one should expect lower levels of male-male competition if all men would pre-
fer to have only one wife, than if they all preferred to have many wives. The goal of this paper is
twofold: to endogenize men’s preferences over polygyny rates, and to analyze the consequences
of these preferences for the evolution of male competitiveness.
Following evolutionary logic, I posit that individuals seek to maximize reproductive success,
defined as the expected number of children that survive to sexual maturity. For any given house-
hold composition, a man and his spouse(s) thus engage in parental care to this end. This is mod-
eled as a non-cooperative game between the adults in the household. Equilibrium fertility and
parental care choices in turn determine the number of wives a man would like to have if he could
choose freely, a number which typically depends on exogenously given factors of the environment,
or the ecology, in which the population evolves. I then use these results to examine the evolution
of the willingness of men to compete against other men. Assuming that male degree of competi-
tiveness is a trait transmitted from father to son, I adopt a standard evolutionary game theoretic
framework (Weibull, 1995) to determine which degrees of competitiveness are compatible with
evolution by natural selection.3 The strategies in the evolutionary game are the degrees of compet-
1I focus exclusively on competition between men at the individual level, not the group level, and hence I do not seek
to explain the prevalence of wars. Moreover, the model is general enough to encompass several kinds of competition,
ranging from physical combat to poetry contests. Hence, low levels of physical violence between men would not be
the only empirical indicator of lack of competitiveness. Several studies have nonetheless shown that levels of physical
violence between men tend to be higher in societies which permit polygyny than in societies which impose monogamy
(see Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, 2012, and the references therein).
2The term “wife” is used for convenience only, since marriage has no function per se in the model. The key assump-
tion is that both males and females engage in parental care, which is a reasonable assumption for humans and some
other species (see Alger and Cox, 2013, for a review of the biology literature on parental care).
3While the mathematical model is silent as to whether the transmission is biological or cultural, recent evidence
on the interacting effects of testosterone and cortisol levels on male willingness to compete (e.g., Knight et al., 2020)
suggests that biological factors do matter (but since the mechanisms are not yet fully understood, father-son correla-
tions are still unknown). Moreover, testosterone levels are on average lower in married than in unmarried men, and
the lowest levels are found in married men with children (Alvergne, Faurie, and Raymond, 2009; Gettler et al., 2011).
Theoretical analysis of transmission routes other than the purely vertical one considered here, which would be possible
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itiveness. Men are matched randomly into pairs to play, and each man’s strategy in any matched
pair determines whether he competes or refrains from competing. Men may differ in their de-
grees of competitiveness: in matched pairs with two non-competitive men, each man settles down
and forms a monogamous household; by contrast, if at least one of the men in a matched pair is
competitive the encounter ends with one winner, who takes over the women of the loser. I charac-
terize the set of evolutionarily stable degrees of competitiveness. Several settings are considered.
First, to reflect the fact that men’s ability to acquire or destruct each other’s productive resources
has changed over the course of history, the stake of the competition may, besides women, include
productive resources. Second, while I first adopt the standard evolutionary game theory frame-
work in which matching between men is uniformly random, I also extend the model to capture
the fact that humans live in groups between which there is limited migration. Furthermore, while
the main analysis takes women to passively accept the husband that emerges from the male-male
competition, I verify that the qualitiative nature of the results are robust to allowing for female
mate choice following the male-male competition game, hence accounting also for the role that
female preferences over household composition play.
Could evolution by natural selection ever be compatible with men refraining from unlimited
competition for women? My model provides three novel answers to this question. First, and in
stark contrast with the standard assumption that male reproductive success increases in the polyg-
yny rate, I show that in some ecologies a man’s reproductive success decreases with the number of
women (although in other ecologies it is increasing or non-monotonic). This result is explained by
men’s investment of time and resources in their children and women’s agency over their fertility.4
In ecologies where the man chooses to provision food, which is a fully rival good, men thus face
a quantity-quality trade-off with respect to the number of wives. I show that the trade-off can
be so severe that the man prefers to have one rather than several wives.5 This in turn has deep
implications for the set of evolutionarily stable degrees of male competitiveness. If the prevailing
strategy consists in being peaceful and if male reproductive success is higher with one than with
two wives, it would not pay off to mutate towards a higher degree of competitiveness in order
to acquire more wives. However, I further find that even in ecologies where male reproductive
success decreases with the number of wives, the highest degree of competitiveness is typically
also evolutionarily stable (more on this below, however). It is easy to see why: if the prevailing
strategy consists in being maximally competitive, a man who mutates towards a lower degree of
if transmission is (fully or partly) cultural, is left for future research.
4While paternal provisioning is rare among mammals (Clutton-Brock, 1991), it did evolve at some point among our
hominin ancestors, and I situate my model in the period of our evolutionary past that follows this ground-breaking
development (see Gavrilets, 2012, and Alger et al., 2020, for theories of male provisioning in the hominin lineage).
Regarding women’s agency over fertility decisions, infanticide by men appears to have been applied mostly to non-
related children (van Schaik and Janson, 2000).
5Clearly, this result hinges on the assumption that a man cannot impose different fertility rates on his wives, i.e., he
cannot use some for reproduction and others for production.
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competitiveness is essentially guaranteed to live a mateless life.
Second, when the stake of the competition also includes productive resources, the nature of
the competition matters. As intuition would suggest, the sustainability of lack of competitiveness
is hampered by forms of competition whereby the winner’s productive resources are bolstered
(through the take-over of land for example), since this raises the reproductive success from hav-
ing more than one wife. Likewise, the sustainability of lack of competitiveness is facilitated by
forms of competition that entail a loss of productive resources (through injury for example), since
this lowers the reproductive success from having more than one wife. However, even though lack
of competitiveness may be evolutionarily stable, maximal competitiveness is also evolutionarily
stable, for the same reason as above: if the prevailing strategy is maximal competitiveness, mutat-
ing towards a lower degree of competitiveness entails a mateless life.
Third, I show that the fact that our ancestors lived in groups of small size, which extended
beyond the nuclear family and between which there was limited migration, should have favored
non-competitive men. It is well known that a key implication of such population structure—
which is part of the environment of evolutionary adaptation of the human lineage (Van Schaik,
2016)—is that mutants, even when rare, face a higher probability of interacting with mutants
than residents do, even absent any ability of individuals to choose the individuals with whom
they interact. In the biology literature, this effect is usually quantified by the coefficient of related-
ness (Wright, 1931), which measures the probability that interacting individuals share a common
ancestor.6 I show that, although the highest degree of competitiveness is always evolutionarily
stable when matching is uniformly random, it no longer is so when the coefficient of relatedness
is high enough. The reason is that polygyny is always inefficient in the sense that overall average
reproductive success is lower under polygyny than under monogamy. If the prevailing strategy
consists in competing as much as possible, relatedness implies that rare mutants who compete
less can reap the benefits of the reduced competition with a non-negligible probability, and thus
outperform the more competitive men.
Brought together, the results of my model indicate that—absent inter-generational transmis-
sion of wealth and unbalanced sex ratios—male-male competition for wives (i.e., sexual partners
into whose offspring the man invests resources) is consistent with evolution by natural selection
only if (a) the ecology is generous enough for the male adult household member to provision
little or no food to the offspring, (b) the competition does not reduce the winning male’s produc-
tive resources too much, and (c) relatedness among males is low enough. Importantly, it is the
combination of these three factors that is necessary for male-male competition for wives to be
compatible with evolution by natural selection.
6See also Hamilton (1964), Frank (1998), and Rousset (2004). For economics models having analyzed the effects
of such relatedness, see Bergstrom (1995, 2003), Alger and Weibull (2010, 2013), and Alger, Weibull, and Lehmann
(2020).
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This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature which
hypothesizes that exogenously given factors in the “ecology” in which a population evolves can
impact the selective pressure on behaviors. This quest, reminiscent of behavioral ecology (Tinber-
gen, 1963), and common in biology and evolutionary anthropology, has recently generated a large
number of empirical studies in economics, which indicate that behavioral heterogeneity observed
today may be traced to differential exposure to various factors in ancient times. Factors that have
thus been examined empirically include production technologies (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn,
2013, BenYishay, Grosjean, and Vecci, 2017), sex ratios (Grosjean and Khattar, 2019), migration
patterns (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009, Ashraf and Galor, 2013, Becker, Enke, Falk, 2020), and
climatic risk (Durante and Buggle, 2020). The differences in several preference indicators across
societies reported by Falk et al. (2018) are also consistent with the hypothesis. While none of
these studies examines variation in male-male competition across societies, my model predicts
that human societies may have diverged in this dimension a long time ago, the competition be-
ing more fierce in some societies than in others. It also provides a rationale for such a divergence.
More generally, this paper joins the theoretical literature that investigates how evolutionary forces
may have shaped human preferences (Frank, 1987, Güth and Yaari, 1992, Bergstrom, 1996, Rob-
son, 2001, 2002, Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel, 2007, Rayo and
Becker, 2007, and Wu, 2020). In particular, it expands the set of preferences that have been ex-
amined, previous studies having analyzed the impact of shock distributions on the discrepancy
between decision and experienced utility (Robson and Samuelson, 2011); of the harshness of the
environment on intra-family altruism (Alger and Weibull, 2010); of the advent of agriculture on
the willingness to defend private property (Bowles and Choi, 2019); of migratory patterns on
preferences governing behavior in social interactions (Alger, Weibull, and Lehmann, 2020).
Second, my findings complement those in the existing literature on the historical evolution of
polygyny rates, which examines factors that I do not consider, such as returns to wealth (Bergstrom,
1994a), the dilution of land ownership due to polygyny (Lagerlöf, 2005), male heterogeneity in
income (Grossbard, 1976, Bergstrom, 1994b) population growth (Tertilt, 2005, 2006), sex ratios
(Edlund and Ku, 2013), heterogeneity in women’s human capital (Grossbard, 1980, Gould, Moav,
and Simhon, 2008), social unrest (Lagerlöf, 2010, De La Croix and Mariani, 2015), and free-riding
in paternal care (Francesconi, Ghiglino, and Perry, 2016). The closest model to mine is that by
Ross et al. (2018), which also features men who provide both a rival and a non-rival good to
their offspring, and where the relative importance of these goods is linked to the ecology in which
the population evolves. Importantly, however, their model (as well as the models cited above)
has exogenously given male preferences over polygyny rates and all disregard men’s willingness
to compete for wives as a fundamental driver of male heterogeneity. Moreover, they all assume
that men would always want more wives, should their price be nil. By contrast, the model pro-
posed here derives male preferences over polygyny rates from first principles and analyzes men’s
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willingness to compete for wives as an inherited trait subject to natural selection. The central
finding is that male reproductive success can decrease with the polygyny rate. This model thus
provides a novel explanation for why a complete lack of male-male competition and the associated
monogamy can be consistent with evolution by natural selection.
The model is presented and analyzed in the next two sections, which are followed by a discus-
sion of the implications of the results for our understanding of the evolution of marriage systems,
and some concluding remarks. All the mathematical proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The child production stage
I model a population in which each individual lives for at most two periods; as a non-productive
and non-reproductive child in the first period, and—conditional on surviving to sexual maturity—
as a productive and reproductive adult in the second period. In each generation the sex ratio is
assumed to be balanced at birth,7 and for simplicity also at the beginning of the adult period. The
analysis focuses on behaviors in the adult period, which has two stages: a male-male competition
stage followed by a child production stage. To simplify the analysis I first consider a model in
which women passively accept to settle down in the household that the outcome of the male-male
competition dictates, but I then lift this assumption.
In the male-male competition stage, men compete for women, and possibly also for productive
resources. The competition sorts men into two categories: those with and those without mates,
where those with mates all have the same number of mates. At the beginning of the child produc-
tion stage, there is thus a number of households, each composed of one man and his (identical)
spouse(s). Within each such household the man and his spouse(s) then engage in tasks, the goal
of each individual being to maximize reproductive success, defined as the expected number of
offspring that survive to sexual maturity.8
While several alternative male-male competition scenarios will be analyzed, the child produc-
tion stage is the same for all of them. Since the reproductive success a man obtains for any given
household composition impacts the benefit of engaging in competitive behavior in the male-male
competition stage, I proceed by backward induction and first analyze the child production stage.
This will allow me to characterize how male reproductive success varies with the number of wives.
7Although the sex ratio can vary significantly from year to year in small populations (see, e.g., Kramer, Schacht, and
Bell, 2017), an (almost) balanced sex ratio at birth is empirically verified when measured for large populations where
sex-specific abortions are not conducted. A balanced sex ratio is also predicted by evolutionary theory (Fisher, 1930).
8In reality mating success of offspring who have survived to sexual maturity also matters for an adult’s reproductive
success. I disregard this here, by letting mate matching be random rather than based on choice.
5
2.1 The household game
Consider a household with one man and his k ≥ 1 spouse(s) entering the child production stage.9
In the main analysis a woman has no say when it comes to the number of wives in the house-
hold.10 However, I assume that she has full agency over her fertility and childcare decisions
(alternative assumptions will be discussed below). Each woman and each man is endowed with
some resources that they devote to parental investment. While in reality these resources may be
multi-dimensional, for simplicity I assume that they can be aggregated into one dimension, and
I will refer to this resource as time. Let the time budgets available for parental investment be
X ∈ (0,1] for each woman and Y ∈ (0,1] for the man. I assume that there is sexual division of la-
bor: the man specializes in protection, women specialize in care, and both the man and the women
provision the children with food (although not necessarily the same kind of food).11 Letting Gj
and Cj denote the amounts of food and care that child j receives from its mother, and Hj and Pj
the amounts of food and protection received from its father, I assume that the probability that the







Cj ,Gj ,Hj , Pj
)
, (1)
where nj is the total number of children that j’s mother gave birth to, and
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where λ,σ ,τ ∈ (0,1).13 The first term in (1) reflects the physical toll of giving birth, where 1/b
can be thought of as the maximum number of children a woman can have before she dies with
certainty (in which case the children die since the mother’s inputs are essential).14 The function
in (2) describes how the parental inputs affect the survival probability. It captures two realistic
9For simplicity, interactions between households, divorce, and unfaithfulness are ruled out by assumption. It would
clearly be desirable to endogenize the degree of unfaithfulness, but this has to be left for future research. For the time
being, one interpretation of the benchmark model considered here is that there is strong social control (for instance,
although they are not explicitly modeled here, there may be grand-parents who monitor how their children behave in
the adult stage, or the females monitor each other). Moreover, most estimates of current extra-pair paternity rates are
low, ranging between 0 and 11% across societies (see Simmons et al., 2004, and Anderson, 2006).
10The consequences of female choice will be examined in Subsection 3.4.
11The terms protection and care should be interpreted broadly. Thus, protection may include shelter construction
and maintenance, active protection against predators, as well as the transmission of human capital pertaining to such
activities. Likewise, care may include the production and mending of clothes, storytelling, as well as the transmission
of knowledge about social rules, plants, and animals.
12Together with the assumption that the sex ratio is balanced, this assumption implies that the expected average
reproductive success of a newborn girl equals that of a newborn boy, even though polygyny will imply that some boys
will obtain a higher reproductive success than other boys.
13Admittedly, more general setups could be imagined. However, this model specification is sufficient to obtain the
novel insights that this paper contributes to the literature.
14Here the physical toll is modeled as a scaling factor: ceteris paribus, the more children a woman has, the smaller is
the survival probability of each of her children. Other specifications could be conceivable, including ones where the
physical toll would have an impact on female productivity. Such alternative specifications are left for future research.
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features. First, food, protection, and care are all essential goods: food is useless unless some
protection and some care is provided, and vice versa. Second, the food provided by the mother
and the father are perfect substitutes, although the food provided by the mother relative to that
provided by the father may be more important (ρ > 1), equally important (ρ = 1), or less important
(ρ < 1); this may depend on the nutritional attributes of different kinds of food in the location
occupied by the population at hand. The parameters λ, σ , and τ measure how protection, care,
and total food intake, respectively, impact the survival probability. These parameter values would
typically also depend on the local environment: protection and care is relatively more important
if there are many predators around or if there are many dangers that children need to learn to
avoid.
The amounts of food, care, and protection that a child j receives, as captured by the vector(
Cj ,Gj ,Hj , Pj
)
(see (1) and (2)), depend on the production decisions of his or her parents, to which
I now turn. Denote by y ∈ [0,Y ] the time that the man devotes to producing food, so that Y − y
is spent on protecting the household. Likewise, denote by xi the time that wife i = 1, ..., k de-
votes to producing food, and X − φxi the time that she spends on caring, where the parameter
φ ∈ (0,1) measures the extent to which a woman may produce food while providing care (his-
torically women have tended to engage in gathering plant-based food, which does not run away
from crying babies, thus rendering food production compatible with simultaneous child care).
Letting ni denote wife i’s number of offspring, the household’s child production allocation is sum-
marized by the vector (n,x, y), where n= (n1, ...,nk) and x = (x1, ...,xk). If all the women adopt the
same fertility and the same time allocation, i.e., if ni = n and xi = x for all i ∈ {1,2, ..., k}, the child
production allocation will be called female-symmetric and be denoted (n,x,y).
Assuming that each adult divides the goods he or she produces equally among his or her






of food from its father, where θ > 0 is the marginal return to male effort devoted to producing





of food produced by its mother, where γ > 0 is the marginal return to female effort devoted to
gathering.15 In other words, the food brought home by the father is divided equally across all his
children, while the food brought home by each mother is divided only across her own children. I
15Constant returns to effort are perfectly compatible with specialization, if, for instance, the marginal return to male
effort devoted to gathering and to caring is strictly lower than that of a female, and the marginal return to female
effort devoted to hunting and to protecting is strictly lower than that of the male. However, the assumption may be
inappropriate for pastoralist societies, where there may be increasing returns to men’s efforts on herding.
7
assume that ργ +θ ≤ 1; this ensures that S always takes a value between 0 and 1.
While food is a rival good, care and protection may be non-rival; for instance, a wall around
the village protects all the children equally well, and a lesson about poisonous plants may benefit





be the amount of protection that each child of wife i receives, where α ∈ [0,1] is the degree of
rivalry of protection. In the extreme case where α = 0, protection is fully non-rival, and each child
receives the full benefit of the total amount of protection produced by the father: p (y,Y ,n) = Y −y.
At the other extreme, if α = 1, protection is a fully rival good, and each child receives an equal
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where β ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of rivalry of care. If β = 0, care is fully non-rival, while if
β = 1, it is a fully rival good.
I assume that all the adult members of the household make independent decisions, and that all
seek to maximize own reproductive success. Thus, each woman i = 1, ..., k chooses her fertility ni
and her time allocation xi , taking the man’s and the other women’s time allocations as given, and
the man chooses his time allocation y, taking the women’s fertility and time allocation decisions
as given. Formally, given k, the situation at hand is thus a simultaneous-move game with k + 1
players; each female player i = 1, ..., k chooses a strategy (ni ,xi) ∈ [0,1/b] × [0,X], while the male
player chooses a strategy y ∈ [0,Y ]. The specification of each individual’s reproductive success,
which is his or her payoff in the game, as a function of the strategy profile (n,x, y), completes the
description of the game. The reproductive success of wife i writes
F (ni ,xi ,n−i , y) = ni ·max {0,1− bni} · s (ni ,xi ,n−i , y) , (7)
where, from (2)-(6),
s (ni ,xi ,n−i , y) =















while the reproductive success of the man is the sum of his wives’ reproductive successes:




















Let Γ denote the household game thus described.16
This completes the description of the decisions taken within a household and their conse-
quences. In the extremely long run, everything in life, including the features and the prevalence
of animals and plants eaten by humans, is endogenous. However, the speeds at which different
elements of a human society evolve, differ. In the model, I assume that the production technology,
the degrees of rivalry of protection and care, the child survival probability function, the amount
of female labor resources, and the physical toll due to childbirth are exogenous and fixed, and
I refer to the associated set of parameters as the ecology. Formally, then, the ecology is the vec-
tor ω =(b,φ,σ ,λ,τ,X,α,β,γ,θ,ρ). The ecology determines how parental time allocations and the
fertility rate together determine male reproductive success, and below it will be seen how this in
turn affects the set of sustainable polygyny rates. For further use below, let the set of ecologies be
denoted Ω, i.e., Ω =
{
ω ∈ (0,1)2 × (0,1)3 × (0,1]× [0,1]2 ×R3 | ργ +θ ≤ 1
}
.17
2.2 Equilibria of the household game
Assuming the game is one of complete information, the following result obtains:
Proposition 1. For any ecology ω, any number of wives k ≥ 1, and any amounts of the male resources
Y , there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the household game Γ . Moreover, this equilibrium is female-
symmetric.
In words, in any household there is a unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile, and, moreover,
at this equilibrium strategy profile all the women choose the same number of children and the
same time allocation. While the model does not allow to obtain a closed-form solution for the
equilibrium number of children, n∗, the expressions for the equilibrium time allocations, x∗ and
y∗, are as follows (x∗ and y∗ are stated as functions of the number of wives k and the amount of male
resources Y , for these are the two variables that will be determined endogenously by the male-
male competition). To simplify the notation let µ ≡ θ/ (ργ); this ratio measures the importance
of food contributed by the man relative to that contributed by the women. Two cases arise: if
τ
σ+τ ≤ φ,
































16For any given polygyny rate k and female-symmetric fertility n, the goals of the man and his spouse(s) are aligned;
hence, the time allocation could have been modeled as resulting from a cooperative game instead of a non-cooperative
one without affecting the results. Relatedly, in an earlier version of the model, I let the man impose his preferred
fertility on his spouse(s); the qualitative nature of the results were the same as those reported here.
17For some parameter constellations the reproductive success is so low that to obtain sensible numerical examples
the expression in (7) must be multiplied by some number above 1. This does not affect the results in any way, however,
since the trade-offs are unaffected by such a positive factor.
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while if τσ+τ > φ,
(x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y )) =

(X,0) if k ≥ µτλ ·
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Inspection of these expressions immediately reveals the following property, which will turn
out to play an important role in the subsequent analysis:
Corollary 1. For any ecology ω, any number of wives k ≥ 1, and any amounts of the male resources Y ,
∂y∗(k,Y )
∂k ≤ 0.
In words, the amount of resources that the man spends on food production, y∗(k,Y ), is (weakly)
decreasing in k. This property arises because an increase in the number of wives k implies that the
man’s food output is shared between a larger number of children. It is thus as if the man’s ability
to produce food relative to that of women was reduced. As a result, an increase in k reduces the
man’s incentive to engage in food production. For k large enough, all the food is produced by the
women (y∗(k,Y ) = 0). As will be seen below this feature is intimately linked with the qualitative
characteristics of male preferences over polygyny rates.
The other comparative statics—which follow from simple calculations that are omitted—are
also intuitive. A higher marginal benefit from producing food (τ) induces both the man and
his spouse(s) to spend more time on food production. Likewise, the man spends less time and
the women more time on food production in ecologies where protection is more important (a
higher λ), while the opposite occurs in ecologies where female care is more important (a higher
σ ). Similarly, in ecologies with greater economies of scope between the two female activities (a
lower φ), the cost for women of allocating time away from caring is smaller, and hence, female
food production is larger; this in turn entails a smaller marginal effect of male food production
on child success, and hence the man devotes less time to food production. Finally, men engage
more in food production relative to women, the more efficient food providers they are compared
to women, i.e., the larger is µ = θ/ (ργ). These results are collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, x∗ is non-decreasing in τ and λ, and non-increasing in φ, σ , and µ,
while y∗ is non-decreasing in τ , σ , φ, and µ, and non-increasing in λ. Neither x∗ nor y∗ depend on α, β,
or n.
In order to prepare the ground for the analysis of the male-male competition stage below, I
now ask the following question: if a man could freely choose the number of wives k, how many
would he choose? The seemingly obvious answer is that the man must always benefit from an
increase in the number of wives. However, this turns out not to be true in general.
10
The equilibrium child production allocation being unique (see Proposition 1) the man’s re-
productive success is uniquely determined for any number of wives k and any amount of male
labor resources Y . Let M∗ : [0,+∞) × (0,1] denote the mapping that to each (k,Y ) associates the
equilibrium male reproductive success, i.e.,
M∗ (k,Y ) =M (n∗ (k,Y ) ,x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y )) , (12)
and note that M∗ (k,Y ) > 0 for any k > 0. The following proposition describes how M∗ varies with
k, for a given amount of male labor resources Y .
Proposition 3. For any Y ∈ (0,1] there exists a partition {Ω1,Ω2,Ω3} of Ω such that Ω1, Ω2, and Ω3
are all non-empty, and:
(1) for any ω ∈Ω1, M∗ (k,Y ) is non-decreasing in k;
(2) for any ω ∈Ω2, there exists k∗ (ω) > 1 such that M∗ (k,Y ) is strictly decreasing in k for all k < k∗ (ω);
(3) for any ω ∈Ω3, M∗ (k,Y ) is strictly decreasing in k.
Men face a quantity-quality trade-off, because producing more children (by having more wives)
entails a decrease in the survival probability of children. The proposition says that: (A) the trade-
off can be so severe that male reproductive success declines if he adds more wives, and (B) the
trade-off is most severe for low polygyny rates. Specifically, depending on the ecology, male re-
productive success is either (1) monotonically increasing; (2) decreasing for low or all polygyny
rates. For ecologies in Ω2, while in all numerical examples I have explored male reproductive
success is increasing for values of k above k∗ (ω), I have not been able to prove this generally. This
is due to the lack a closed-form solution for the equilibrium fertility rate n∗, which also explains
why a characterization of the partition {Ω1,Ω2,Ω3} of Ω referred to in Proposition 3 cannot be ob-
tained. As a result it proves useful to study a modified household game, in which the man imposes
both his preferred time allocation and his preferred (common) fertility rate on his spouse(s). The
following lemma, which reports the results of this analysis, refers to this threshold value for the
degree of rivalry of male protection (all the arguments necessary to prove this lemma are found
in the proof of Proposition 3):
α̂ ≡
ργx∗ (1,Y ) + (1− τ)θy∗ (1,Y )
λ [ργx∗ (1,Y ) +θy∗ (1,Y )]
. (13)
Lemma 1. Consider a modified household game, in which the man imposes both his preferred time allo-
cation and his preferred (common) fertility rate on his spouse(s). Then, for any (k,Y ), he would choose
(x∗(k,Y ), y∗(k,Y )), i.e., the Nash equilibrium time allocation of household game Γ , and he would choose
at least as many children per wife as that chosen in game Γ . Letting M̃ (k,Y ) denote the reproductive
success that the man would achieve in this modified game:
(i) if y∗ (1,Y ) = 0 or if α ≤ α̂, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 1 (the inequality being strict if y
∗ (1, k) = 0
11
and αλ , 1, or if α < α̂);




and ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k > 0
for all k > k̂;
(iii) if αλ = 1, then M̃ (1,Y ) ≥ M̃ (k,Y ) for all k > 1, the inequality being strict if and only if y∗ (1,Y ) > 0.
Since M̃ provides an upper bound for the equilibrium male reproductive success M∗ in game
Γ , this lemma generates the following insights.
First, it shows that a key variable behind the result that male reproductive success is decreasing
in the polygyny rate for some parameter values (see Proposition 3) is the man’s involvement in
food production. To see this, note that in Lemma 1 y∗(1, k) > 0 is a necessary condition for male
reproductive success to be strictly decreasing in the polygyny rate for some parameter values.
The intuition is as follows. Any time spent by the man on food production means that he uses
resources to produce a fully rival good. This in turn renders the quantity-quality trade-off more
severe than if he spent all his resources on producing the somewhat non-rival good protection.
Since, as discussed above (see Proposition 1), male food production declines with the number
of wives, this severe trade-off can only appear for low polygyny rates. As the number of wives
grows large enough, the man stops engaging in food production, and adding more wives must
then be beneficial (unless protection is almost fully rival). This explains why, for given male
labor resources Y , male reproductive success cannot be increasing for low and decreasing for high
polygyny rates.
Second, Lemma 1 reveals that the degree of rivalry of protection, α, also plays a central role.
The less rival is protection, the more the man stands to benefit from an increase in the number of
wives. In the extreme case where protection is fully non-rival (α = 0), he benefits from an increase
in k at all polygyny levels. By continuity, the same result obtains as long as α is sufficiently
small. Thus, α must be sufficiently large for male reproductive success to be decreasing for some
polygyny rates.
Third, Lemma 1 shows that the existence of ecologies where equilibrium male reproductive
success decreases in the polygyny rate reported in Proposition 3 does not hinge on the assumption
that women have agency over fertility and time allocation decisions, since it obtains even when
the man can impose his preferred (common) fertility rate and time allocation on the women.18
I conclude the analysis of the child production stage by stating an additional set of results for
the original household game Γ in the following proposition (whose trivial proof is omitted):
18Clearly, however, the qualitative nature of the results reported in Proposition 3 would be jeopardized if a man
could impose zero fertility on some wives and use these as labor resources to raise the children he sires with the other
wives. The female agency assumption is justified for several reasons, however. First, a woman who is told to have
no children has extremely strong incentives to flee. Second, even if such a woman stays with her husband, she has
no incentive to perform the production of food and care diligently. Third, absent efficient contraceptive methods, the
man would have to refrain from consummating the marriage with these wives, and it is not clear how realistic such an
assumption would be. Of course, one could counter-argue that the man can resort to consummation with all wives cum
discriminatory infanticide; however, this would likely simply worsen the two preceding issues.
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Proposition 4. For any given ecology ω ∈Ω:
(1) holding Y fixed, M∗ (2k,Y ) ≤ 2M∗ (k,Y ), and the inequality holds as an equality if and only if male
protection is fully non-rival (α = 0) and the man devotes no time to food production (y∗ (k,Y ) = 0 for
any k ≥ 1);
(2) holding k ≥ 1 fixed, M∗ (k,Y ) is continuous and strictly increasing in male labor resources Y , and
limY→0M∗ (k,Y ) = 0;
(3) holding Y fixed, ∂F∗ (k,Y ) /∂k ≤ 0, and the inequality is strict unless male protection is fully non-
rival (α = 0) and the man devotes no time to food production (y∗ (k,Y ) = 0 for any k ≥ 1).
The proposition says first that returns to wives are decreasing except in the extreme case where
protection is fully non-rival and the man devotes all his time to providing protection, in which
case returns are constant. The second result establishes that male reproductive success is increas-
ing in the productive resources he controls. Finally, a woman’s reproductive success is strictly
decreasing in the polygyny rate in her household, except in the extreme case where protection is
fully non-rival and the man devotes all his time to providing protection.
I am now in a position to analyze the first stage of the adult period, namely, the male-male
competition stage.
3 The male-male competition stage
In the male-male competition stage men compete for access to women. While competition can
also affect productive resources, I first analyze the case where it does not. Throughout, all the
women are taken to be identical. Men are also identical when entering the competition stage,
except potentially in their eagerness to compete, which is the trait whose evolution I analyze.
Women are assumed to simply accept to join the household to which the male-male competition
gives rise; the consequences of lifting this assumption will be examined in Subsection 3.4.
3.1 Competition when only women are at stake
To model male-male competition I posit an evolutionary game—the competition game—which con-
cerns the male part of the population. Adopting a standard evolutionary game theoretic approach
(e.g., Weibull, 1995), I assume that there is a continuum of male individuals and that each man is
“programmed” to play a certain strategy, which may be interpreted as his eagerness to compete,
or degree of competitiveness, inherited from his father.19 The competition game sorts men into two
categories: “winners” and “losers.” The winners get an equal number of wives each, while the
losers remain mateless (or die, depending on the nature of the competition). Hence, this game
19In a more general model, each man could be equipped with preferences guiding his behavior in the competition
game, and the transmitted trait would be the preferences. The simpler approach adopted here is in some settings
equivalent to such preference evolution, and it also provides a useful benchmark (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2019).
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endogenizes the allocation of women across men. The objective of the analysis is to determine the
set of evolutionarily stable degrees of competitiveness. The nature of the competition—i.e., whether
it takes the form of physical combat or a poetry contest, for example—is exogenous to the model.
To capture the main forces present in this model, it is sufficient to consider the simplest pos-
sible competition game, with only two pure strategies. Specifically, suppose that when entering
the adult stage (from the teenage years) each man has one girlfriend, and that men are then (uni-
formly) randomly matched into pairs to play a simultaneous-move game with two pure strategies,
Compete and Surrender. The strategy profile used in a matched pair determines the number of
women accruing to each man. Thus, if both men play Surrender each gets to marry his teenage
sweetheart. If at least one man plays Compete, then one of them gets to marry both girlfriends
while the other one becomes mateless and remains so forever. A man who plays Compete wins
with probability 1 if the other plays Surrender, and with probability 1/2 if the other plays Com-
pete.
In a matched pair where the strategy profile (Surrender, Surrender) is used, two monogamous
households are thus formed. In the child production stage this gives rise to expected male repro-
ductive success M∗ (1,Y ) for each of these men. Likewise, in a matched pair where at least one
player plays Compete, one bigynous household is formed, and the lucky man obtains expected
male reproductive success M∗ (2,Y ) while the unlucky man gets zero reproductive success. Ac-
cordingly, the payoffs in the evolutionary game are those in the matrix in Figure 1 (since this is a
symmetric game, only the row player’s payoffs are shown).
Surrender Compete
Surrender M∗ (1,Y ) 0
Compete M∗ (2,Y ) 12M
∗ (2,Y )
Figure 1. Payoffs in the competition game with constant productive resources
Let r ∈ {0,1} denote a (pure) strategy in the evolutionary game, where r = 0 means Surrender
and r = 1, Compete. Allow for mixed strategies and write ζ ∈ [0,1] for the probability of playing
Compete. Now ponder the following thought experiment: suppose that a given strategy ζ, the
“resident” strategy, is used by almost everyone in the population, except for a small share ε > 0
of individuals who use another strategy ζ′, the “mutant” strategy. Is there any resident strategy ζ
that outperforms every possible “mutant” strategy ζ′ ∈ [0,1], ζ′ , ζ, in the sense that those who
carry the resident strategy get a strictly higher reproductive success on average than those who
carry the mutant strategy, when mutants are rare? In other words, are there any evolutionarily
stable strategies (ESS) in this evolutionary game? As an illustration, suppose that Compete is
the resident strategy, present in a share 1 − ε of the population, and Surrender the mutant one,
present in a share ε of the population. Compete is evolutionarily stable against Surrender if there
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exists some threshold value ε̄ > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄), the average reproductive success of a




+ ε ·M∗ (2,Y ) > ε ·M∗ (1,Y ) . (14)
Likewise, Surrender is evolutionarily stable against Compete if for all ε close enough to zero:




The following proposition fully characterizes the set of evolutionarily stable strategies.
Proposition 5. In the competition game with constant productive resources:
(i) ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable if and only if the ecology ω is such that:
M∗ (1,Y ) >M∗ (2,Y ) . (16)
(ii) No mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) is evolutionarily stable in any ecology ω ∈Ω.
(iii) ζ = 1 is evolutionarily stable in any ecology ω ∈Ω.
In other words, in some circumstances a population consisting of non-competitive men can re-
sist the invasion of competitive men. Under constant productive resources, the ecology in which
the population evolves is shown to be central: Surrender is evolutionarily stable in ecologies where
men achieve a higher reproductive success with one than with two wives, given constant produc-
tive resources Y (condition (16)). To see why, suppose that Surrender is the resident strategy.
Any mutant—who plays Compete—then almost surely achieves reproductive successM∗ (2,Y ), be-
cause he is almost surely matched with a resident, who Surrenders. However, the vast majority
of residents are matched with other residents, and they all achieve reproductive success M∗ (1,Y ).
Hence, residents who play Surrender outperform rare mutants who play Compete if, and only if,
M∗ (1,Y ) >M∗ (2,Y ).
Nevertheless, as shown in the last part of the proposition, Compete is always evolutionarily sta-
ble, i.e., even when condition (16) holds. To see why, suppose that Compete is the resident strategy.
Any Surrendering mutant then almost surely achieves reproductive success equal to 0, because he
is almost surely matched with a resident, who Competes. By contrast, almost all residents get
reproductive success M∗ (2,Y ) /2. 21
20Evolutionary stability is a static equilibrium concept, akin to that of Walrasian market equilibrium. A dynamic
model would be necessary to account for the fact that sons of men who play Compete do not have the same mating
success as sons of men who play Surrender. Indeed, to account for such differences one would need a model that tracks
how the strategy distribution in generation t + 1 depends on that in generation t.
21Note that this result would obtain even under the less stark assumption that playing Surrender against someone
playing Compete would give a positive probability of winning, as long as this probability would be below 1/2.
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Finally, as indicated in the second part of the proposition, the competition game with constant
productive resources admits no evolutionarily stable mixed strategy. To see why, consider a pop-
ulation where some mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) is the resident strategy and the mutant pure strategy
Compete. An individual who is matched with a resident then does equally well whether he is a
resident or a mutant (to see this, note that for a mixed strategy to be ESS it must be such that the
residents achieve the same average reproductive success whether they play Surrender or Compete);
however, an individual who is matched with a mutant does strictly better if he is a mutant than
if he is a resident, since the latter then gets the same reproductive success as the mutant with
probability 1− ζ but 0 reproductive success with probability ζ.
In sum, when men compete for women alone there is either one or two evolutionarily stable
strategies, depending on the ecology. The assumption that a man’s productive resources (Y ) do not
depend on the number of rounds he competes is, however, restrictive. Indeed, this would require
both that the resources a man can ever hope to control are his own physical labor resources, and
that these labor resources are unaffected by the amount of competition. In particular, competition
cannot entail any risk of physical injury. While examples of male-male competitions satisfying
these requirements are conceivable (think of song or poetry contests and chess tournaments), the
quest for a model that could help reach a better understanding of the evolution of male-male
competition calls for a more general version of the male-male competition game, one in which
men compete for both reproductive and productive resources. I now turn to such a model.
3.2 Competition when both women and productive resources are at stake
In the competition game with endogenous productive resources, a male who has successfully com-
peted one round has productive resources ϕ, which may differ from his initial resources Y (e.g.,
because of injuries from physical combat, the destruction of tools, the take-over of the opponent’s
productive resources, etc.). The payoff matrix of this evolutionary game is shown in Figure 2.
Surrender Compete
Surrender M∗ (1,Y ) 0
Compete M∗ (2,ϕ) 12M
∗ (2,ϕ)
Figure 2. Payoffs in the competition game with endogenous productive resources
While many factors can affect the material resources accruing to the winner of a competition,
it seems reasonable to put an upper bound on ϕ. Specifically, I assume that competition can at
most allow the winner to acquire all of the loser’s resources, i.e., ϕ ∈ [0,2Y ]. The following results
obtain.
Proposition 6. In the competition game with endogenous productive resources:
(i) ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable if and only if:
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(1) either the ecology ω is such that M∗ (1,Y ) >M∗ (2,Y ) and ϕ < Y +A, where A > 0 is the amount
of male resources such that M∗ (1,Y ) =M∗ (2,Y +A);
(2) or the ecology ω is such that M∗ (1,Y ) < M∗ (2,Y ) and ϕ < Y −B, where B > 0 is the amount of
male resources such that M∗ (1,Y ) =M∗ (2,Y −B).
(ii) No mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) is evolutionarily stable in any ecology ω ∈Ω.
(iii) ζ = 1 is evolutionarily stable for any ω ∈Ω as long as ϕ ∈ (0,2Y ].
As shown in the proof of the proposition, Surrender is evolutionarily stable if and only if
M∗ (1,Y ) > M∗ (2,ϕ). Since the equilibrium male reproductive success function M∗ is increas-
ing and continuous in the man’s productive resources, this implies that Surrender is evolutionarily
stable if either (1) the ecology is such that Surrender is evolutionarily stable when productive
resources are constant and winning one round of competition does not enhance productive re-
sources by too much, or (2) the ecology is such that Surrender is not evolutionarily stable for con-
stant resources but winning one round of competition entails a large enough drop in productive
resources.
The astute reader will have noticed that while Compete is evolutionarily stable for any positive
ϕ > 0, it no longer is so for ϕ = 0. To see why, recall that Compete is evolutionarily stable against
Surrender if there exists some threshold value ε̄ > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄), the average repro-
ductive success of men playing Compete, when this is the resident strategy present in a share ε of




+ ε ·M∗ (2,ϕ) > ε ·M∗ (1,Y ) . (17)
As long as resource depletion is not complete (i.e., for any ϕ > 0), M
∗(2,ϕ)
2 > 0 and the inequality
holds for ε close enough to zero, even if M∗ (1,Y ) > M∗ (2,ϕ) (to see this, set ε = 0, and note that
both the left-hand and the right-hand side is continuous in ε). By contrast, when Compete entails
full resource depletion (ϕ = 0), average reproductive success is nil for men playing Compete while
it is strictly positive for men playing Surrender.
In sum, then, on top of ecological factors, any factors (e.g., technological and/or institutional
factors) that affect the material resources accruing to the winner of a competition should also be
expected to impact the evolutionary stability of non-competitive males. Remarkably, however,
these factors have no impact on the evolutionary stability of competitive males: in all the set-
tings analyzed above Compete is an evolutionarily stable strategy. This is true even though any
population would be better off as a whole if males were non-competitive, since female reproduc-
tive success is strictly decreasing in the polygyny rate (this follows from Proposition 4 and the
assumption that winning a competition cannot more than double a man’s productive resources
(ϕ ≤ 2Y ).22 In other words, in any setting where both Surrender and Compete are evolutionar-
22The only setting in which female reproductive success is not strictly decreasing in the polygyny rate is when pater-
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ily stable, evolution could have led either to the (efficient) absence of male-male competition, or
to the (inefficient) presence of male-male competition, where efficiency is measured in terms of
female reproductive success.
In the next subsection I extend the model to allow for an ubiquitous aspect of human life that
will be seen to sometimes render the strategy Compete evolutionarily unstable.
3.3 The effects of relatedness on male-male competition
So far, the analysis has disregarded an important and ubiquitous feature of human societies,
namely, the fact that our ancestors lived in groups of small size, which extended beyond the
nuclear family and between which there was limited migration.23 A key implication of such pop-
ulation structure is that mutants, even when rare, face a higher probability of interacting with
mutants than residents do, even absent any ability of individuals to choose the individuals with
whom they interact. In the biology literature, this effect is usually quantified by the coefficient
of relatedness (Wright, 1931), which measures the probability that interacting individuals share a
common ancestor. In order to extend the model in this direction I adopt the formalization pro-
posed by Bergstrom (2003) (see also Grafen, 1979, Alger and Weibull, 2013, and Jensen and Rigos,
2018).24
Thus, consider the evolutionary game analyzed in the preceding subsection, and denote the
resident strategy by ζ ∈ [0,1] and the mutant strategy by ζ′ ∈ [0,1], ζ′ , ζ, the latter being present
in a (small) share ε > 0 of the population. The assortment function σ : (0,1) → [−1,1] maps to
each mutant population share ε ∈ (0,1) the difference between the probability for a resident to be
matched with a resident and a mutant to be matched with a resident (the assortment function is
the same for all (ζ,ζ′) ∈ [0,1]2):





In the special case of uniform random matching, there is no difference, i.e., σ (ε) = 0 for all ε ∈
(0,1). I assume that both conditional probabilities Pr[ζ|ζ,ε] and Pr[ζ|ζ′ , ε] are continuous in ε,
and denote by σ0 the limit of the assortment function σ as the share of mutants tends to zero:
σ0 ≡ limε→0σ (ε). Noting that limε→0 Pr[ζ|ζ,ε] = 1 (because the population is infinitely large), it
is clear that limε→0σ (ε) = 1− limε→0 Pr[ζ|ζ′ , ε] = limε→0 Pr[ζ′ |ζ′ , ε]. In other words, σ0 is also the
nal investment comes in the form of a purely public good (α = 0) and all the productive resources are acquired by the
winning male (ϕ = 2Y ). It is then constant in the polygyny rate.
23Admittedly, migration rates are higher in some populations than in others, and they can be quite high (see, e.g.,
Kramer, Schacht, and Bell, 2017). However, what matters for the discussion at hand is that less than 100% of men leave
their natal group.
24While this formalization is less fine-grained than that obtained in the classic island model in evolutionary biology
(see, e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer, 1971, Frank 1998, Rousset 2004, Hartl and Clark, 2007), it is sufficient for my
purposes. For a recent adoption of the island to preference evolution in srategic interactions, see Alger, Weibull, and
Lehmann (2020).
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probability that a mutant is matched with another mutant in the limit as the share of mutants
tends to 0. It follows that σ0 ∈ [0,1]. For my purposes I will say that relatedness is present when




2 ·M∗ (1,Y )
, (19)
the following results obtain.
Proposition 7. In the competition game with endogenous productive resources and relatedness:
(i) the set of parameter values for which ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable when σ0 = 0 (see Proposition 6) is
a proper subset of the set of parameter values for which ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable when σ0 ∈ (0,1] .
(ii) No mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) is evolutionarily stable in any ecology ω ∈Ω.
(iii) ζ = 1 is evolutionarily stable if σ0 < σ̃0 while it is not evolutionarily stable if σ0 > σ̃0.
Comparing these results to those reported for the setting without relatedness (σ0 = 0) in Propo-
sition 6, it is clear that relatedness works in favor of the Surrender strategy and against the Compete
strategy. The effect is twofold.
First, relatedness expands the set of parameter constellations for which Surrender is evolution-
arily stable. Compared to the setting without relatedness, competition can entail a larger increase
in productive resources ϕ−Y without threatening the stability of Surrender in ecologies for which
Surrender is evolutionarily stable under constant resources; likewise, a smaller drop in produc-
tive resources Y −ϕ due to competition is sufficient to render Surrender evolutionarily stable in
ecologies for which Surrender is evolutionarily stable under constant resources.
Second, and in stark contrast with Propositions 5 and 6, Compete fails to be evolutionarily
stable if relatedness is pronounced enough. The threshold value for σ0 (see (19)) is the ratio
of male reproductive success obtained if all males Compete (M∗ (2,ϕ) /2) to that obtained if all
males Surrender (M∗ (1,Y )). To understand why, suppose that Compete is the resident strategy
and Surrender the mutant one. A necessary condition for Compete to be evolutionarily stable
against Surrender is that the average reproductive success of residents be at least as large as that
of mutants, when the share of mutants tends to zero, i.e.:
M∗(2,ϕ)
2
≥ (1− σ0) · 0 + σ0 ·M∗(1,Y ). (20)
The right-hand side shows that, even in a population where essentially all individuals Compete, a
vanishingly rare mutant, who Surrenders, faces a positive probability of interacting with another
mutant, thereby being able to settle down with his teenage girlfriend. If Compete entails an in-
efficiency, i.e., if M∗ (2,ϕ) /2 falls short of M∗ (1,Y ), and if rare mutants have a sufficiently strong
tendency to interact with each other, the necessary condition (20) is violated: the inefficient strat-
egy Compete then cannot withstand the invasion of the more efficient strategy Surrender.
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Thus, whenever the threshold value σ̃0 for σ0 falls short of 1, Compete fails to be evolutionarily
stable for any σ0 ∈ (σ̃ ,1]. The ratio in (19) depends both on the ecology (ω) and on the effect of
competition on productive resources (ϕ − Y ). For any given effect of competition on productive
resources, σ̃ is increasing in the effect of adding a second wife under constant productive resources
(M∗(2,Y ) −M∗(1,Y )). And for any given ecology, σ̃ is increasing in the productive resources that
competition bestows on the winner (ϕ).
3.4 Female choice
Clearly, the assumption that women passively accept to join the household allocated to them
through the male-male competition is highly restrictive. Here I extend the model to allow for
female choice, thus accounting for female preferences.
Following the male-male competition stage, women can choose between accepting the house-
hold formation (as above) and not accepting it, in which case one woman settles down with the
winner and the other with the loser; I assume that the winner’s teenage sweetheart (the “first
wife”) gets to choose first. The key issue is how the male-male competition affects the men’ pro-
ductive resources. Letϕ−∆ denote the productive resources accruing to the loser, where ∆ > 0. As-
suming, as above, that a winner can garner at most an amount Y by winning a contest, ∆ ∈ (0,2Y ):
if ∆ is close to 2Y , the man who loses a contest also loses almost all his productive resources.
Clearly, in this extreme case a woman would prefer to marry bigynously with the winner (who
has productive resources close to 2Y ) than monogamously with the loser (who has productive
resources close to zero). The following proposition follows immediately from this observation
together with the fact that the female equilibrium reproductive success function F∗ is continu-
ous and increasing in the man’s productive resources, and is decreasing in k (see the last part of
Proposition 4).
Proposition 8. If women can choose a husband after the male-male competition stage:
(i) in populations where all men Surrender, each woman accepts to marry monogamously;
(ii) in populations where all men Compete, the loss of productive resources ∆ takes a value in (0,2Y )
depending on the nature of the contest, and there exists ∆̃ ∈ (0,2Y ) such that the second wife prefers
bigynous marriage with the winner to monogamous marriage with the loser iff ∆ > ∆̃.
Faced with the fait-accompli of the male-male competition, female reproductive success is higher
under bigyny than under monogamy whenever it generates a large enough difference between
the winner’s and the loser’s productive resources.25 Overall, the proposition shows that the as-
sumption that women passively accept the household composition determined by the male-male
25This is in line with the polygyny threshold model (Orians, 1969), and the ensuing literature on polygyny arising from
male heterogeneity (see the references in the introduction). The advantage is that here the heterogeneity among men is
endogenously determined through male-male competition.
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competition is innocuous in settings where (under the passivity assumption) either Surrender is
evolutionarily stable, or Compete is evolutionarily stable and the competition gives rise to enough
heterogeneity in productive resources between the men (∆ > ∆̃).
It remains to be seen whether female choice alters the results in settings where under female
passivity Compete is evolutionarily stable, but where both the winner and the loser would end
up marrying monogamously upon competing when the passivity assumption is lifted. In other
words, is Compete evolutionarily stable in the male-male competition game when the contest af-
fects only the productive resources? The payoff matrix of this game is shown in Figure 3. The next
proposition treats this case, allowing for relatedness.
Surrender Compete
Surrender M∗ (1,Y ) 0
Compete M∗ (1,ϕ) 12 [M
∗ (1,ϕ) +M∗ (1,ϕ −∆)]
Figure 3. Payoffs in the competition game which bestows productive resources ϕ ∈ (0,2Y ] on the
winner and ϕ −∆ > 0 on the loser, with female mate choice and ∆ < ∆̃
Letting
σ̂0 ≡
M∗ (1,ϕ) +M∗ (1,ϕ −∆)
2 ·M∗ (1,Y )
, (21)
the following result obtains.
Proposition 9. Consider the competition game where the winner’s productive resources exceeds those
of the loser by ∆ ∈ (0, ∆̃). Under female choice, Compete is evolutionarily stable if the coefficient of
relatedness σ0 is smaller than σ̂0 while it is not evolutionarily stable if σ0 > σ̂0.
In other words, the qualitative nature of the condition for Compete to be evolutionarily stable
obtained under female passivity is preserved under female choice. Interestingly, however, relat-
edness can be less effective at preventing male-male competition with than without female choice.
For example, in the extreme case where ∆ ≈ 0 and ϕ = Y , the threshold value σ̂0 ≈ 1. This is be-
cause when female choice leads to monogamy, it prevents the inefficiency inherent to bigyny from
arising.
The model disregards the possibility that women develop a taste or distaste for more com-
petitive men. Analysis of the evolution of such preferences would require a different model,
which would include a detailed analysis of the matching process in the marriage market (and in
particular of how conflict between women with the same preferences over male types would be
resolved).26 Likewise, the model abstracts from sources of heterogeneity among men beyond their
26An interesting challenge for such a generalization will be to determine whether one should also allow for the
evolution of male preferences over female preferences over male competitiveness, and so forth.
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degree of competitiveness and productive resources, such as as strength, speed, intelligence etc.
These factors should certainly be should be taken into account in future research, which may thus
examine the interaction of female preferences over such attributes and the forces studied here.
3.5 Summing up
Taken together, the results reported above suggest that—absent inter-generational transmission of
wealth and unbalanced sex ratios—in human history high levels of male competitiveness would
have been consistent with evolution by natural selection only in times and places where the fol-
lowing three conditions were met simultaneously.
1. The ecology ω must be generous enough for the male adult household member not to be
required to engage heavily in provisioning food (or some other rival good) to his offspring.
2. In the least generous ecologies the competition must increase the winner’s productive re-
sources enough for the women to prefer bigynous marriage with the winner than monoga-
mous marriage with the loser.
3. Relatedness between competing males must be low enough.
Importantly, it is the combination of these three factors, rather than each factor alone, that is
necessary for high levels of competitiveness to be compatible with evolution by natural selection.
The next section discusses the ramifications of these insights for our understanding of the
evolution of marriage systems in human history. In particular, I argue that the combination of
the three factors mentioned above may well have been uncommon over the course of human
history, suggesting that polygynous marriage may have been driven mostly by forces omitted in
this model (such as the ability to transmit wealth across generations, which for any given degree
of competitiveness induces heterogeneity in men’s ability to win a contest).
4 Discussion
The theoretical model analyzed above provides a rich set of predictions. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to conduct a formal empirical analysis (which would necessitate fine-grained
data that would allow to control for factors not considered in this model), in this section I dis-
cuss the model predictions in light of a few important sources of variation across human sub-
populations over space and time. In the model a population is fully described by the following
three components: the ecology (ω ∈ Ω), the effect of competition on male productive resources
(Y −ϕ), and the coefficient of relatedness (σ0 ∈ [0,1]). I first discuss in general how the ecology
and the coefficient of relatedness may have varied across space and time, and then propose a struc-
tured comparison of different human sub-populations through history, a comparison which also
22
discusses how technological change may have altered the effect of competition on male productive
resources.
Prior to the industrial revolution, the vast majority of people were self-sustaining farmers,
horticulturalists, pastoralists, or hunter-gatherers. As such, their livelihoods depended to a large
extent on the climatic, geological, and ecological conditions in their local environment. Since
Homo sapiens had colonized all continents except Antarctica already in pre-neolithic times, in
terms of the model this means that different human sub-populations faced a rich set Ω of differ-
ent ecologies both in pre- and in post-neolithic times. Sources of variation would have included
the marginal returns to male and female food production efforts, the nutritional value of local
food sources, environmental hazards—such as natural disasters, predators, and attacks by other
groups—some of which it was possible to protect against, etc. Arguably, it is reasonable to assume
that in pre-industrial times (and using again the term “ecology” as defined in the model): (1) at
any point in time there would have been significant spatial variation between the ecologies ω ∈Ω
faced by human sub-populations; and (2) in any given location, sub-populations that adopted
agriculture would have experienced a substantial change in the ecology ω compared to the pre-
neolithic one, because of changes in the food production technology and in the food sources, and
possibly also in the prevalence of environmental hazards; there would nonetheless still be spatial
variation in the ecologies faced by sub-populations having adopted agriculture, due to variation
in geological and climatic conditions.
In the model the ecology matters because it affects the quantity-quality trade-off that men
face. Hence, the model predicts that male reproductive success as a function of the number for
wives may have been quite different in a climate with long and harsh winters than in a tropical
or sub-tropical climate. Existing studies do suggest a significant impact of the ecology (as defined
in the model, i.e., incorporating all aspects of food and care production) on reproductive success,
even for populations living in the same natural environment. For example, a comparison of agri-
culturalists and nomadic herders in Northern Finland born between 1641 and 1884 shows that
the agriculturalists had, on average, a significantly higher number of offspring, about 0.3 children
more per (monogamous) family, while there was no significant difference in mortality prior to
adulthood (Helle et al., 2014). A study of contemporary Pumé, an indigenous group in Venezuela,
revealed that women among the horticulturalist river Pumé have a significantly larger number of
children who survive to adulthood than the foraging savannah Pumé (Kramer and Greaves, 2007).
Turning to relatedness, the key driver is migration. To see this, consider first a population in
which each individual would migrate on his/her own from the group into which (s)he was born
to a randomly chosen group of people anywhere else in the world. In such a population, the prob-
ability of interacting with individuals sharing a recent common ancestor would be close to zero.
By contrast, if only some individuals disperse from their natal group, or if all disperse to a place
close to the birthplace, the probability of interacting with individuals sharing a recent common
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ancestor is positive. Clearly, human sub-populations are best described by the second scenario.
What matters for the model is the relatedness among men, and thus men’s dispersal. While com-
prehensive historical data is simply missing, some studies do provide some insights. For example,
in their study of dispersal of individuals born in Finland between 1749 and 1880, Nitsch, Lum-
maa, and Faurie (2016) find that around 20% of all individuals who survived to the age of 15
moved out of their birth parish, and that the average distance between the birth parish and the
destination parish was only 65km. While these numbers were similar for men and women, a key
difference between the sexes was that among the individuals who dispersed, women were almost
twice as likely to move to the spouse’s birth parish, implying a higher coefficient of relatedness
among young men than among young women.27
With these factors in mind, I structure the discussion of the model predictions around two
qualitatively different types of society, according to the impact of competition on a man’s produc-
tive resources. In this discussion I will assume that ϕ = bcY , where c ∈ [0,1] and b ∈ [1,2] are
parameters representing, respectively, the resource depletion and resource accumulation associ-
ated with competition.
4.1 Competition without resource accumulation: pre-neolithic societies
Imagine a society where the only labor resources a man can ever hope to control are his own
physical labor resources; that is, slavery is not an option, and no or little accumulation of material
resources beyond those necessary for survival (such as basic tools and shelter) is possible. In such
a society, the only prize that men compete for is access to women. If competition, moreover, entails
some risk of physical injury, then labor resources may be expected to decline with competition,
or at least not increase. In terms of the model, in this society, the accumulation factor b would be
equal to or close to 1, while the depletion factor c would be small enough for competition to entail
resource depletion, or at least not any resource accumulation (bc ≤ 1).
Arguably, this scenario appears plausible for many human societies prior to the neolithic rev-
olution. Absent agricultural production, any group of Homo sapiens had to rely on the food pro-
vided by its surrounding natural environment, rendering individual land ownership irrelevant. In
most places climatic conditions further restricted the ability to store any food surpluses. While it
is challenging to evaluate the extent to which men provisioned children with food in pre-neolithic
times, among modern hunter-gatherers and horticulturalists men heavily engage in such provi-
sioning, at least in some societies (Kaplan et al., 2001).28 Moreover, since Homo sapiens mastered
27This would be in line with Murdock’s ethnographic atlas, according to which virilocality (the tendency for women
to move to the husband’s locality) has been more prevalent than uxorilocality (the tendency for men to move to the
wife’s locality): out of 1267 societies, 692 were classified as mainly virilocal and only 305 as mainly uxorilocal. This
classification has been revisited in past years, however; see, e.g., Kramer and Greaves (2011) an references therein.
28Moreover, a recent study suggests that male provisioning had already evolved when Homo sapiens appeared (Alger
et al., 2020; see, in particular, the discussion of the paleontological and archeological evidence).
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the production and use of lethal tools such as axes and spears, contests between men could entail
significant physical injury.
Viewed through the lens of my model, it thus appears plausible that pre-neolithic societies
would have evolved to have non-competitive men and monogamous unions: challenging ecolog-
ical conditions coupled with the absence of resource accumulation (bc ≤ 1) could have been such
that male reproductive success was higher with one than with two wives (M∗(1,Y ) > M∗(2,ϕ)),
thus rendering the Surrender strategy evolutionarily stable, i.e., non-competitive men compatible
with evolution by natural selection. If, moreover, relatedness among young men was high enough,
the Compete strategy would not have been evolutionarily stable (see Proposition 7). Such a conclu-
sion would be compatible with evidence from traditional societies that have been observed over
the past few hundred years: an overwhelming majority of unions in these societies are monoga-
mous (see the references in the second paragraph of the introduction).29
4.2 Competition with resource accumulation: agricultural societies
In terms of the model, the advent of agriculture brought about two key changes. First, in any
given location on Earth, the adoption of agriculture likely induced a change in some parameters
of the ecology ω =(b,φ,σ ,λ,τ,X,α,β,γ,θ,ρ), especially the marginal returns to male and female
labor in food production (the parameters γ , θ, and ρ), but potentially also the extent to which the
non-food contribution of the father was a rival good (the parameter α). Second, food production
became based on transferable assets such as land and farmed animals.30 In the model the former
change would typically have induced changes in the intra-household division of labor, while the
latter change meant that, contrary to most pre-agricultural societies, the control of productive
assets now also became a stake of male-male competition. I argue that in the model these two
changes may have had either qualitatively similar or opposite effects on male-male competition.
First, the type of crops and animal husbandry that a sub-population adopted, together with
the tools at hand as well as the local geological and climatic conditions, would all have mattered
for the precise changes in the ecology ω that the adoption of agriculture would have induced. In
particular, these factors could have led men to become more or less involved in the production
of food (and other non-rival goods) than in pre-agricultural times. For example, men’s involve-
ment in food production may have intensified more in societies that adopted the plough than
in societies that didn’t (Goody, 1976). Ceteris paribus, the changes in ω due to the transition to
agriculture could thus have either strengthened or weakened the evolutionary stability of the Sur-
29There are some interesting exceptions, however. For example, polygyny is quite common among the Yanomamö in
Venezuela, although the men who marry polygynously are not wealthier than those who do not (Hames, 1996). This is
consistent with the evolutionary stability of the Compete strategy even in societies where winners do not take over the
productive resources of their adversaries.
30Recently, a model proposed by Bowles and Choi (2019) suggests that the property rights institution developed
early on during the Neolithic transition.
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render strategy.
Second, in an extreme variant of a society in which productive assets are seizable, the winner’s
productive resources double (bc = 2). If the protection that the man provides to the children in
his household is not fully rival (α < 1) the reproductive success of a man with two wives is more
than twice as large as that of a man in a monogamous union, while if it is fully rival (α = 1) his
reproductive success is exactly twice as large. In any event, in such a society only Compete would
be evolutionarily stable, because the coefficient of relatedness required to prevent this would be
excessively high (σ̃ ≥ 1, see equation (19)). A doubling of productive resources does not appear
historically relevant, however: since productive resources would have included the man’s own
labor, a doubling of productive resources would have required the losing man to become the
winner’s slave. Hence, the most likely scenario is that in the early agricultural societies the winner
would see his productive resources increase but not double (1 < bc < 2). The model predicts that
this would have tilted the balance in favor of the Compete strategy.
Arguably, however, the advent of metallurgy further affected the trade-offs. Indeed, signifi-
cant technological advances followed in the footsteps of the agricultural life-style. In particular,
weapons became more sophisticated and lethal, especially with the advent of metallurgy. As a
result, men would have had to sacrifice an increasing amount of resources to make or acquire
weapons and adequate protective gear. In the model such technological advances correspond to
a decrease in the depletion parameter c over time. Depending on the accumulation parameter b,
this development could have induced a negative net effect of competition on productive resources
(i.e., bc < 1). Hence, the advent of metallurgy should have tilted the balance back in favor of the
Surrender strategy.
4.3 Three major paths?
In sum, my findings suggest that the evolution of the prevalence of polygynous unions in any
given human sub-population is specific to the local constraints it faced together with the technol-
ogy it adopted for food extraction (the “ecology” ω in the model), the seizability and/or vulnera-
bility of productive resources due to male-male competition (the difference ϕ − Y in the model),
and the extent to which competing males share a recent common ancestor (the relatedness pa-
rameter σ0). In particular, the discussion above indicates that the transition to an agricultural
life-style would not necessarily have given rise to more competitive men and polygyny, especially
in ecologies in which men chose to engage substantially in the production of food (and/or some
other rival goods).31 More generally, the theoretical findings and the discussion above point to
three major historical development paths for human sub-populations, each path being defined
by its most common marriage system in pre-neolithic times, in neolithic times, and during the
31Note that any effects of storability of wealth is absent from my model since there is no transfer of wealth between
generations. Such storability could thus have had effects on top of those discussed here.
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bronze and iron ages.
• Path 1: Monogamy - Polygyny - Polygyny
• Path 2: Monogamy - Polygyny - Monogamy
• Path 3: Monogamy - Monogamy - Monogamy
In accordance with the discussion in subsection 4.1, all paths have monogamy as the main mar-
riage system in pre-neolithic times.32 Due to the seizability of productive assets—especially
land—that it implied, the adoption of agriculture would have led to significant levels of polygyny,
but only in societies where ecological conditions were such that men did not need to engage heav-
ily in the production of food (Paths 1 and 2). Hence, polygyny would not have arisen in human
sub-populations which either did not adopt agriculture or which did transition to agriculture but
faced harsh conditions that rendered strong male involvement in food production necessary (Path
3).33
Finally, among the populations that adopted agriculture, a distinction can be made between
those that later adopted metallurgy and those that didn’t. Those that didn’t should not have expe-
rienced any change. Those that did develop metallurgy may—due to the lethality of weapons—
either have continued to be largely monogamous (Path 3), transitioned back from polygyny to
monogamy if the relatedness among competing males was high enough (Path 2), or remained
polygynous if the relatedness among competing males was low enough (Path 1).34
Remark. While I have focused the discussion on Homo sapiens, the model arguably applies to any species
in which males provide parental care. An obvious illustration that comes to mind is birds, in which
“monogamy is ten times more common [...] than in mammals” (De Waal and Gavrilets, 2013). Since
male birds tend to provision their hatchlings with food, this observation appears to be consistent with
the model predictions. However, a rigorous test of whether paternal provisioning of food (or some other
rival good) is correlated with monogamy across species would require a dataset that includes numerous
other factors that evolutionary biologists have identified as potential ultimate drivers of monogamy (see,
e.g., Klug, 2018).
32This is in line with Fortunato (2011), who concludes based on a phylogenetically controlled study that monogamy
likely was a common marriage form among early Indo-European peoples, prior to the advent of state-like social struc-
tures.
33The finding by Barber (2008) that polygyny is found mostly in tropical countries with plenty of arable land is
consistent with this hypothesis. See also Lee and Whitbeck (1990) and references therein for evidence of correlation
between polygyny and female labor investment in food production.
34Taken together, these three paths should have induced the share of men who were successful at reproducing to
be the lowest in neolithic societies. This is consistent with the drop in Y-chromosome diversity for the period between
approximately 10kya and 6kya, and the subsequent rise in this diversity, as inferred from contemporary data by Karmin
et al. (2015). These paths would further be consistent with the relatively low levels of physical violence observed
between men, and which has been the subject of many theories (see the overview by Seabright, 2004); the theory
proposed here arguably sheds new light on this question.
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5 Conclusion
Biological reproduction is the central driver of natural selection, and in a sexually reproducing
species such as ours the competition for reproductive resources is fiercer for men than for women.
One should therefore expect evolutionary forces to have shaped the inclination to compete differ-
ently for men and for women. The model proposed here contributes to the understanding of these
forces, by examining the competition between men for access to both reproductive and productive
resources, when the driver of behavior is biological reproductive success. The analysis focuses on
three ubiquitous features of human history that arguably had first-order effects on the incentives
for men to engage in competitive strategies. First, local ecological factors, such as the effort needed
to produce food and the returns from the father’s and the mother’s protection and care, was key to
reproductive success in all pre-industrial times. Second, the advent of agriculture brought about
a drastic change in the incentives to compete; however, by contrast to the storability of wealth that
is often put forward as being the key effect of agriculture, I focus on the seizability of productive
assets that the advent of agriculture brought about. Finally, the model also incorporates the fact
that in all human societies there is limited migration; such limited migration implies that compet-
ing men would typically have been related. The central insight is that in this setting high levels
of male competitiveness are consistent with evolution by natural selection only if (a) the ecology
in which the population evolved would have been generous enough for males to supply little or
no food to their children, (b) competing would not have been too costly in terms of productive
resources, and (c) relatedness among males would have been low enough.
While the model innovates in several respects compared to the existing literature on the evolu-
tion of marriage systems, it disregards some arguably relevant aspects, which should be accounted
for in future research. First, it would be interesting to extend the model to allow for the ability to
transmit wealth across generations (Bergstrom, 1994a, Lagerlöf, 2005). Second, while ecological
constraints and relatedness may have led men to refrain from competing against each other within
groups, as suggested by my model, competition between groups of males for women and produc-
tive resources may have arisen instead (Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, 2012). This hypothesis
finds support in the empirical analyses of historical Y-chromosome diversity by Balaresque et al.
(2015) and Zeng, Aw, and Feldman (2018). Third, and as pointed out by Betzig (1992), “marriage
in Rome was monogamous; mating was polygynous”. Hence, future analyses should also examine
the consequences of sexual infidelity for the evolution of male competitiveness.35 Finally, in the
model I take the degree of competitiveness to be transmitted “vertically”, from father to son. Fu-
ture research may examine if the results are robust to a mix of vertical and oblique transmission,
that would be relevant if male competitiveness is a cultural rather than a biological trait (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001).
35For further inspiration on this and related topics, see Hrdy (1999) and Fisher (2016) and references therein.
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The theory presented here is arguably also relevant beyond the question of how marriage sys-
tems evolved in human societies. Indeed, it adds the competition for mates as an ultimate driver
of willingness to outperform others, to the literature on the evolutionary foundations of inter-
dependent preferences (Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi, 2000a,b, Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel, 2007,
Alger, Weibull, and Lehmann, 2020). Since this literature has hitherto neglected biological dif-
ferences between men and women, this paper contributes insights to aspects of the evolution of
competitiveness that are specific to men. A similar approach could be used to investigate aspects
of the evolution of competitiveness specific to women. This line of research could thus help un-
derstand and interpret the evidence suggesting that men and women differ in their willingness to
outperform others (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini, 2003, Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Ville-
val, 2013, Apicella and Dreber, 2015; see also Croson and Gneezy, 2009, and Bertrand, 2011, for
surveys).
6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
I first prove that any Nash equilibrium strategy profile is female-symmetric. To this end, I as-
sume, by contradiction, that there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy profile according to which
k1 women play strategy (n1,x1), k2 = k − k1 women play strategy (n2,x2) , (n1,x1), and the man
plays strategy y. Defining
a(n) = max{0,1− bn}, (22)
the necessary conditions for this to be an equilibrium are:
(n1,x1) ∈ arg max
(n,x)∈[1,+∞)×[0,X]







(n2,x2) ∈ arg max
(n,x)∈[1,+∞)×[0,X]







(k1−1,k2) denotes the (k − 1)-dimensional vector whose first k1 − 1 components equal
n1 and the remaining k2 components equal n2, and (n1,n2)
(k1,k2−1) the (k − 1)-dimensional vector
whose first k1 components equal n1 and the remaining k2 − 1 components equal n2. Furthermore,
the strategies (n1,x1) and (n2,x2) must yield the same reproductive success, i.e.:












Without loss of generality, assume that n1 > n2. Then a woman who deviates from (n1,x1) to
(n2,x2) achieves reproductive success























σ · [ργx2n2 + θy(k1 − 1)n1 + (k2 + 1)n2
]τ
.

















σ · [ργx2n2 + θyk1n1 + k2n2
]τ
.
Together with (25), this in turn implies











which contradicts (23). A similar argument proves that there exists no Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile in which women employ three or more different fertility strategies. I conclude from
this that any equilibrium of the household game is such that all women have the same fertil-
ity. Together with strict concavity of s in its second argument (x), this implies that the womens’
equilibrium time allocations are also identical.
Having thus proved that any Nash equilibrium strategy profile is female-symmetric, I proceed
to characterize the set of Nash equilibria. Any female-symmetric strategy profile (n∗,x∗, y∗) is a
Nash equilibrium strategy profile if and only if
n∗ ∈ argmaxn∈[1,+∞)F
(




n∗,x, (n∗)(k−1) , y∗
)
y∗ ∈ argmaxy∈[0,Y ]M (n∗,x∗, y) ,
(28)
where (n∗)(k−1) denotes the (k − 1)-dimensional vector whose components all equal n∗.
Define the mappings g : [1,+∞)→R+ and s̃ : [0,X]× [0,Y ]→ [0,1] by
g (n) = n1−αλ−βσ−τ · a (n) (29)
30
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respectively. Then note that given that all women choose n∗, a woman’s reproductive success is
separable in her time allocation x and the number of children n∗, since F can then be written:
F
(
n∗,x, (n∗)(k−1) , y∗
)
= k−αλ · g (n∗) · s̃ (x,y∗) . (31)
Likewise, given that all women choose n∗, the man’s reproductive success is also separable in his
time allocation y and the number of children per woman n∗:
M (n∗,x∗, y) = k ·F
(
n∗,x, (n∗)(k−1) , y∗
)
= k1−αλ · g (n∗) · s̃ (x∗, y) .
Since k1−αλ · g (n∗) ≥ k−αλ · g (n∗) > 0 for any k ≥ 1 and any n∗ (where the strict inequality follows
from revealed preference) the last two equations in (28) are equivalent to x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈[0,X] s̃ (x,y∗)y∗ ∈ argmaxy∈[0,Y ] s̃ (x∗, y) , (32)
implying that any equilibrium female-symmetric household time allocation (x∗, y∗) ∈ [0,X]× [0,Y ]
is independent of the number of children n∗ per wife. The next part of the proof characterizes the
set of female-symmetric equilibrium household time allocations (x∗, y∗) ∈ [0,X]× [0,Y ].
To begin, note that y = Y cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy profile. Suppose, to the
contrary, that (x∗, y∗) = (x∗,Y ) for some x∗ ∈ [0,X]. Then s̃ (x∗, y∗) = 0 for any x∗ ∈ [0,X], while for any
y ∈ (0,Y ), s̃ (x∗, y) > 0. Similarly, (x∗, y∗) = (0,0) cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile. Indeed,
s̃ (0,0) = 0, while, for any y ∈ (0,Y ), s̃ (0, y) > 0.
Next, it is straightforward to verify that, for each ecologyω and each y ∈ [0,Y ), s̃ (x,y) is strictly
concave in x. Likewise, for each female time allocation x ∈ [0,X], s̃ is strictly concave in y. Hence,
it is sufficient to study the first-order partial derivatives of s̃ (x,y) to determine the best response
functions.


























obtains that of ∂s̃(x,y)∂y has the same sign as
Yθτ − kλργx −θ (λ+ τ)y. (34)
This expression being strictly decreasing in y, it is non-negative for all y ∈ [0,Y ] iff it is non-
negative for y = Y , i.e., if Yθτ − kλργx − θ (λ+ τ)Y ≥ 0, which is false. The expression in (34) is
non-positive for all y ∈ [0,Y ] iff it is non-positive for y = 0, i.e., iff Yθτ − kλργx ≤ 0, or
x ≥ Yθτ/ (kλργ) ≡ x1.








and I conclude that the male’s best response to the female strategy x (where x is chosen by each of
the k women) is:  ym = 0 if x ∈ [x1,X]ym = Y τλ+τ − kλργθ(λ+τ)x if x ∈ [0,x1] . (36)
Turning now to the (representative) woman’s best response:
∂s̃ (x,y)
∂x



















obtains that ∂s̃(x,y)∂x has the same sign as
Xkτργ − (σ + τ)kργφx − σφθy. (38)
This expression being strictly decreasing in x, it is non-negative for all x ∈ [0,X] iff it is non-










Note that y0 ≥ 0 iff ττ+σ ≥ φ. The expression in (38) is non-positive for all x ∈ [0,X] iff it is non-
positive for x = 0, i.e., iff Xkτργ − σφθy ≤ 0, or









Figure 1: Woman’s (red) and Man’s (blue) best response curves







I conclude that a female’s best response to the male strategy y is:
xf = 0 if y ∈ [y1,Y ]
xf = Xτ(σ+τ)φ −
σθ
(σ+τ)kργ y if y ∈ [max {0, y0} , y1]
xf = X if y ∈ [0,max {0, y0}].
(40)
The figure below shows the woman’s best response curve in red, and the man’s best response curve
in blue.
Inspection of this figure indicates that a sufficient condition for there to exist a unique equilibrium
is that the (absolute value of the) slope of the man’s best response curve (for values of x ∈ [0,x1]) be
strictly smaller than the (absolute value of the) inverse of the slope of the (representative) woman’s
best response curve (for values of y ∈ [y0, y1]), which is true:
∣∣∣∣dymdx ∣∣∣∣ = kλργθ(λ+τ) < (σ+τ)kργσθ = ∣∣∣∣1/ (dxfdy )∣∣∣∣.
Combining (36) and (40), two cases may be distinguished, depending on whether y0 ≤ 0 or
y0 > 0. First, if
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Second, if τσ+τ > φ (i.e., if y0 > 0)
(x∗, y∗) =











































The last part of the proof concerns the equilibrium number of children per woman. To begin,
note that if there is only one wife (k = 1) she chooses the number of children n that maximizes
n1−αλ−βσ−τ · a (n) · (Y − y∗)λ · (X −φx∗)σ · (ργx∗ +θy∗)τ , (43)
or g (n)·s̃ (x∗, y∗), where g (n) was defined in (29). Since (x∗, y∗) does not depend on n, this amounts to
choosing n to maximize g (n). If interior (n > 1), the solution must satisfy the first-order condition
g ′ (n) = (1−λα − σβ − τ) (1− bn) ·n−λα−σβ−τ − bn1−λα−σβ−τ = 0. (44)
Hence, two cases arise.
Case A: 1−λα − σβ − τ ≤ 0. Then g ′ (n) < 0 for all n ∈ [1,+∞), in which case n∗ = 1.
Case B: 1−λα − σβ − τ > 0. Then the second derivative
g ′′ (n) = (1−λα − σβ − τ)
[
− (λα + σβ + τ) (1− bn)n−λα−σβ−τ−1 − 2bn−λα−σβ−τ
]
(45)
is strictly negative, so that either n∗ = 1 (if g ′ (1) ≤ 0), or there exists n > 1 that satisfies the neces-
sary first-order condition for an interior solution, g ′ (n) = 0. Since g ′ (n) = 0 iff n = 1−λα−σβ−τ(2−λα−σβ−τ)b , the
solution for k = 1 writes:
n∗ (1) = max
{
1,
1−λα − σβ − τ
(2−λα − σβ − τ)b
}
. (46)
Turning now to the general case k > 1, an interior equilibrium n∗ > 1 must satisfy the first-order
condition: [
g ′ (n) · s
(
n,x∗, (n∗)(k−1) , y∗
)
+ g (n) · s1
(




where s1 denotes the partial derivative of s with respect to its first argument. Since s (·) > 0,
g (n) > 0, and s1 (·) < 0, this equation implies that at an interior equilibrium n∗, g ′ (n∗) > 0, which
in turn implies that for any k for which n∗ (k) > 0, n∗ (k) < n∗ (1). Note that this further means that
if 1−λα − σβ − τ ≤ 0, then n∗ (k) = 1 for all k ≥ 1. Finally, note that since the absolute value of s1
increases while s decreases as k increases (ceteris paribus), this equation further implies that n∗ (k)
is strictly decreasing in k.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is in two steps. I begin by proving that even if a man could impose his most preferred
female-symmetric child production allocation on his wives, his reproductive success would not
necessarily be increasing in the number of wives. I will then show that this result, together with
Proposition 1, implies that his reproductive success would not necessarily be increasing in the
number of wives under the assumption that women do have agency over their fertility and time
allocation decisions. This modeling strategy simplifies the calculations (note that it also delivers
one robustness check as a by-product).
Step 1: Analysis for a (hypothetical)manwhowould be able to choose his preferred female-
symmetric child production allocation.
Consider a man who has k wives, and who chooses n and (x,y) to maximize




















Lemma 2. For any ecology ω, any number of wives k ≥ 1, and any amount of labor resources Y ≥ 0,
there exists a unique female-symmetric child production allocation (n̂, x̂, ŷ) that maximizes male repro-
ductive success M̂ (x,y,n). Furthermore, x̂ = x∗ and ŷ = y∗.
Proof: To begin, note that the man’s maximization problem is separable in n and (x,y), since
the objective function in (48) can be written
M̂ (n,x,y) = k1−αλ · g (n) · s̃ (x,y) , (49)
where g (n) was defined in (29) and s̃ (x,y) in (30). Specifically, choosing (n,x,y) ∈ [1,+∞)× [0,X]×
[0,Y ] to maximize M̂ (n,x,y) boils down to choosing n ∈ [1,+∞) to maximize g (n) and (x,y) ∈
[0,X]×[0,Y ] to maximize s̃ (x,y). In view of the system of equations (32), which defines the unique
Nash equilibrium time allocations x∗ and y∗ in game Γ , this observation clearly implies that the
solution entails setting x = x∗ and y = y∗.





1−λα − σβ − τ




Writing the man’s preferred female-symmetric fertility and time allocations n̂, x̂, and ŷ as
functions of the number of wives k ≥ 1 and the man’s time budget Y , the reproductive success
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that the man achieves can be written as a function of k and Y :
M̃ (k,Y ) ≡ M̂ (n̂ (k,Y ) , x̂ (k,Y ) , ŷ (k,Y )) . (50)
The following lemma shows how M̃ varies with k, holding Y constant. In this lemma,
α̂ ≡
ργx∗ (1,Y ) + (1− τ)θy∗ (1,Y )
λ [ργx∗ (1,Y ) +θy∗ (1,Y )]
, (51)












Lemma 3. Consider a man who, for any given number of wives k ≥ 1 and labor resources Y , can choose
(n,x,y) so as to achieve reproductive success M̃ (k,Y ) (see (50)). For such a man:
(i) if y∗ (1,Y ) = 0 or if α ≤ α̂, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 1 (the inequality being strict if y
∗ (1, k) = 0
and αλ < 1, or if α < α̂);




and ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k > 0
for all k > k̂;
(iii) if α = λ = 1, then M̃ (1,Y ) ≥ M̃ (k,Y ) for all k > 1, the inequality being strict if and only if
y∗ (1,Y ) > 0.
Proof: Using the notation introduced in the proof of Lemma 2, and letting
s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) = [Y − y∗ (k,Y )]λ · [X −φx∗ (k,Y )]σ ·
[





one obtains the following expression for male reproductive success as a function of k (see equation
(50)):
M̃ (k,Y ) = M (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , n̂, k) (54)
= g (n̂) · k1−λα · s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) ,
where n̂ is defined in (46). Upon dividing the expression in (54) by the strictly positive constant
g (n̂), one obtains that ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k has the same sign as
(1−λα) · k−λα · s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) (55)
+k1−λα ·

























∂s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k)
∂k

















so that (56) reduces to
ds∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k)
dk
=






· [Y − y∗ (k,Y )]λ · [X −φx∗ (k,Y )]σ ·
[













· s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) .
Plugging this into (55), dividing by s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) · k−λα ·
[





strictly positive), and rearranging the terms, one obtains that ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k has the same sign as
A (k) ≡ (1−λα) ·
[








Recalling that y∗(k,Y ) is decreasing in k, let k̃ ≥ 0 denote the threshold value such that y∗ (k,Y ) > 0
















Now note the following:
Remark 1. y
∗(k,Y )
k is strictly decreasing in k for any k < k̃ and constant in k for any k ≥ k̃.
Remark 2. For any (α,λ) ∈ [0,1]×(0,1], 1−λα ≥ 0 . Furthermore, 1−λα = 0 if and only if α = λ = 1,
in which case A (k) has the same sign as −y∗ (k,Y ). The remaining remarks pertain to the case
α ·λ < 1.
Remark 3. The term in square brackets in (58) (which is the total amount of food produced for
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each brood of n̂ children) writes






























if τσ+τ ≤ φ, and







































if τσ+τ > φ. In either case, this term is always strictly positive. Furthermore, it is strictly
decreasing in k for any k < k̃ and constant in k for any k ≥ k̃.
Remark 4. Suppose that k̃ > 1. Then A (k) changes sign at most once for k ∈ [1, k̃). Indeed, suppose
















(Note that k̂ must indeed be strictly smaller that k̃ since A (k) > 0.for any k ≥ k̃.) Since
ργx∗ (k,Y ) + θy
∗(k,Y )
k > 0 for all k, and since (1−λα) · ργ > 0, both the left-hand side and the




is decreasing in k, it must be that (1−λα) · ργx∗ (k,Y ) > (τ − 1 +λα) · θy
∗(k,Y )
k for
any k > k̂.
Remarks 1 - 4 together imply:
A. If α = λ = 1 and y∗ (1) = 0, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k = 0 for all k ≥ 1.
B. If α = λ = 1 and y∗ (1) > 0, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k < 0 for all k ∈ [1, k̃) and
∂M̃(k,Y )
∂k = 0 for all k ≥ k̃.
C. If αλ < 1 and y∗ (1) = 0, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k > 0 for all k ≥ 1.
D. If αλ < 1 and y∗ (1) > 0, then ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k > 0 for all k ≥ k̃ > 1. Moreover, a sufficient condition for
M̃ to be non-monotonic in k is that ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=1
< 0, which is true if and only if
(1−λα) [ργx∗ (1,Y ) +θy∗ (1,Y )] < τθy∗ (1,Y ) . (63)
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Because x∗ (1,Y ) and y∗ (1,Y ) do not depend on α, and since ργx∗ (1,Y ) + θy∗ (1,Y ) > 0, the
left-hand side can be viewed as an affine and strictly decreasing function of α, which takes
the value 0 for α = 1/λ and the value ργx∗ (1,Y ) + θy∗ (1,Y ) > 0 for α = 0. Hence, (63) is
equivalent to
α >
ργx∗ (1,Y ) + (1− τ)θy∗ (1,Y )
λ [ργx∗ (1,Y ) +θy∗ (1,Y )]
≡ α̂. (64)
Because A (k) changes sign at most once (see Remark 4), the condition α > α̂ is also necessary






∂k < 0 for all k ∈ [1, k̂),
∂M̃(k,Y )
∂k < 0 if k = k̂, and
∂M̃(k,Y )
∂k > 0 for all k > k̂. Finally, if α ≤ α̂,
∂M̃(k,Y )
∂k ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 1, with a strict inequality for all k ≥ 1 if and only if α < α̂.
Q.E.D.
Step 2: Analysis of the implications of the analysis in Step 1 for the model in the text.
Returning to the case where the unique Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game Γ is
played in each household, consider the equilibrium male reproductive success M∗ (k,y), which
can be written:
M∗ (k,Y ) = g (n∗ (k)) · k1−λα · s∗ (x∗ (k,Y ) , y∗ (k,Y ) , k) , (65)
where n∗(k) was defined in (46) and (47), and s∗ (·) in (53). Using the expression for the reproduc-
tive success that a male who can impose his preferred female-symmetric allocation on his wives
(see (54)), I obtain
M∗ (k,Y ) =
g (n∗ (k))
g(n̂)
· M̃ (k,Y ) . (66)
Referring to the same cases as in the proof of Proposition 1, I immediately obtain:
Case A: 1−λα − σβ − τ ≤ 0. Then n∗ (k) = n̂ = 1 for all k ≥ 1, so that g(n
∗(k))
g(n̂) = 1 and M
∗ (k,Y ) =
M̃ (k,Y ) for all k ≥ 1.
Case B: 1−λα − σβ − τ > 0. Then, for all k > 1, n∗ (k) < n̂ = n∗ (1), and hence M∗ (1,Y ) = M̃ (1,Y )
while M∗ (k,Y ) < M̃ (k,Y ) for all k > 1.
The statement in Proposition 3 follows from these results together with Lemma 3. To see this,
note that:
1. there exist ecologies ω such that (a) y ∗ (1,Y ) = 0, (b) n∗(k) = n̂ for all k ≥ 1, and (c) ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k > 0




Y ; this proves that Ω1 , ∅;
2. in ecologies such that ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k < 0 for small values of k: sinceM
∗ (1,Y ) = M̃ (1,Y ) andM∗ (k,Y ) ≤
M̃ (k,Y ) for all k > 1, and both M∗ and M̃ are continuous in k, M∗ is strictly decreasing in k
for small enough values of k; this proves that Ω2 , ∅;
3. there exists ecologies such that ∂M̃(k,Y )∂k < 0 and n
∗(k) = n̂ for all k ≥ 1; the above arguments
then imply that M∗ (k,Y ) = M̃ (k,Y ) for all k ≥ 1; this proves that Ω3 , ∅.
39
6.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The results in the proposition follow from standard analysis (see Weibull, 1995, p.40), by noting
that since 12M
∗(2,Y ) > 0 the game is:
1. a Coordination Game if M∗(1,Y ) > M∗(2,Y ); then both pure strategies are evolutionarily
stable;
2. a Prisoner’s Dilemma if M∗(2,Y ) > M∗(1,Y ): then only the “non-cooperative strategy” r = 1
is evolutionarily stable;
3. never a Hawk-Dove game: this explains why there is no ecology for which there exists an
evolutionarily stable mixed strategy.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The results in the proposition follow from standard analysis (see Weibull, 1995, p.40). First, for
any ϕ ∈ (0,2Y ], 12M
∗(2,ϕ) > 0 and hence the game is:
1. a Coordination Game ifM∗(1,Y ) >M∗(2,ϕ), i.e., if either the ecologyω is such thatM∗ (1,Y ) >
M∗ (2,Y ) and ϕ < Y +A, where A > 0 is the amount of male resources such that M∗ (1,Y ) =
M∗ (2,Y +A), or the ecology ω is such that M∗ (1,Y ) < M∗ (2,Y ) and ϕ < Y − B, where B > 0
is the amount of male resources such that M∗ (1,Y ) =M∗ (2,Y −B); then both pure strategies
are evolutionarily stable;
2. a Prisoner’s Dilemma if M∗(2,ϕ) > M∗(1,Y ): then only the “non-cooperative strategy” r = 1
is evolutionarily stable;
3. never a Hawk-Dove game: this explains why there is no ecology for which there exists an
evolutionarily stable mixed strategy.
Second, consider the case ϕ = 0. Then M∗(2,ϕ) = 0 and the argument in the text (see (17)) shows
that Compete is not evolutionarily stable. I now show that Surrender is evolutionarily stable. Sup-
pose that Surrender (i.e., the mixed strategy ζ = 0) is the resident strategy and that a share ε > 0 of
the population carries the mutant strategy ζ′ , 0. The average reproductive success of a resident
(who settles down with his teenage girlfriend when matched with another resident and loses with
certainty when matched with a mutant who Competes) is then
(1− ε) ·M∗ (1,Y ) + ε · [ζ′ · 0 + (1− ζ′) ·M∗ (1,Y )], (67)
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while that of a mutant (who wins with certainty against a resident when he plays Compete and
with probability 1/2 when matched with another mutant who plays Compete) is
ζ′ ·
[





+(1− ζ′) · [(1− ε+ ε(1− ζ′)) ·M∗ (1,Y ) + εζ′ · 0].
Strategy ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable against ζ′ = 1 iff there exists some ε > 0 such that for all
ε ∈ (0, ε) the expression in (67) is strictly larger than the expression in (68). Clearly, by virtue
of the continuity of the expressions in ε, a sufficient condition is that when evaluated at ε = 0
the expression in (67) is strictly larger than that in (68), a condition which reduces to M∗ (1,Y ) >
M∗ (2,ϕ), which holds for ϕ = 0 since M∗ (2,0) = 0.
Finally, I show that for ϕ = 0 there exists no mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) which is evolutionarily
stable. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists some mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) which is evolu-
tionarily stable. Then ζ must be such that the two pure strategies Compete and Surrender yield the
same reproductive success, i.e.:




However, this equality is violated since ϕ = 0 implies that the right-hand side is nil.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Claim (i): ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable if and only if the ecology ω is such that M∗ (1,Y ) >
M∗ (2,Y ) and ϕ − Y is not too large. Suppose that ζ = 0 is the resident strategy and that a share
ε > 0 of the population carries the mutant strategy ζ′ , 0. The average reproductive success of a
resident (who settles down with his teenage girlfriend when matched with another resident and
loses with certainty when matched with a mutant who Competes) is then




· [ζ′ · 0 + (1− ζ′) ·M∗ (1,Y )], (70)
while that of a mutant (who wins with certainty against a resident when he plays Compete and









ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
(1− ζ′)] ·M∗ (2,ϕ) + Pr
[













ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
(1− ζ′)) ·M∗ (1,Y ) + Pr
[
ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
ζ′ · 0].
Strategy ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable against ζ′ ∈ (0,1] if and only if there exists some ε > 0 such
that for all ε ∈ (0, ε) the expression in (70) is strictly larger than the expression in (71). Clearly,
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by virtue of the continuity of the expressions in ε (recall that the conditional probabilities are
continuous in ε), a sufficient condition is that when evaluated at ε = 0 the expression in (70) is
strictly larger than that in (71), a condition which reduces to
M∗ (1,Y ) >M∗ (2,ϕ)−
[
(1− ζ′)σ ·M∗ (1,Y ) + σζ′/2 ·M∗ (2,ϕ)
]
(72)
where σ = limε→0 Pr[ζ′ |ζ′ , ε]. Note now that for any σ ∈ (0,1] and any ζ′ ∈ (0,1] the term inside
the square brackets in inequality (72) is strictly positive. Recalling the definitions of A and B in
the proof of Proposition 6, I can thus conclude that, for any ζ′ ∈ (0,1]:
• if the ecology ω is such that M∗ (1,Y ) > M∗ (2,Y ), then there exists some A′(ζ′) > A > 0 such that
strategy ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable against ζ′ if ϕ < Y +A′(ζ′);
• if the ecology ω is such thatM∗ (1,Y ) <M∗ (2,Y ), then there exists some B′(ζ′), where B > B′(ζ′) >
0, such that strategy ζ = 0 is evolutionarily stable against ζ′ if ϕ < Y −B′(ζ′).
Claim (ii): there exists no mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) which is evolutionarily stable. Suppose,
to the contrary, that there exists some mixed strategy ζ ∈ (0,1) which is evolutionarily stable.
Then, ζ must be such that the two pure strategies Compete and Surrender yield the same repro-
ductive success, i.e.:




Assume now that ζ is the resident strategy, and consider the mutant strategy ζ′ = 0, represented
in a share ε of the population. Then, residents get, on average, reproductive success equal to
(1− ζ)
[




·M∗ (1,Y ) + (1− ζ)Pr[ζ|ζ,ε]ζ · 0 (74)
+ζ
[














(1− ζ) + Pr
[
ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]]




ζ · 0. (75)
A necessary condition for ζ to be evolutionarily stable against ζ′ = 0 is that, when evaluated at
ε = 0, the expression in (74) be at least as large as that in (75), i.e.:
(1− ζ)2 ·M∗ (1,Y ) + ζ(1− ζ/2) ·M∗ (2,ϕ) ≥ [(1− σ )(1− ζ) + σ ] ·M∗ (1,Y ) . (76)
Using (73), this reduces to
0 ≥ ζσ ·M∗ (1,Y ) . (77)
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Given that ζ ·M∗ (1,Y ) > 0, this inequality is false for any σ > 0.
Claim (iii): ζ = 1 is evolutionarily stable if σ < σ̃ but it is not evolutionarily stable if σ >
σ̃ . Suppose that ζ = 1 is the resident strategy and that a share ε > 0 of the population carries
the mutant strategy ζ′ ∈ [0,1). The average reproductive success of a resident (who wins with
probability 1/2 when matched with another individual playing Compete and with certainty when













+ (1− ζ′) ·M∗ (2,ϕ)
]
, (78)












+ (1− ζ′) ·Pr
[
ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
(1− ζ′) ·M∗ (1,Y ) . (79)
By continuity of these expressions in ε, a necessary condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable
against ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is that, when evaluated at ε = 0, the expression in (78) be at least as large as that










Since the right-hand side of this inequality attains its maximum for ζ′ = 0, a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable against any ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is that it be evolutionarily
stable against ζ′ = 0. Replacing ζ′ by 0 in the preceding inequality, I conclude that a necessary
condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable against any ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is:
σ ≤
M∗ (2,ϕ)
2 ·M∗ (1,Y )
. (81)
By continuity of the expressions in (78) and (79) in ε (recall that the conditional probabilities are
continuous in ε), this condition is also sufficient if it holds as a strict inequality.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose that ζ = 1 is the resident strategy and that a share ε > 0 of the population carries the mu-
tant strategy ζ′ ∈ [0,1). The average reproductive success of a resident (who wins with probability
1/2 when matched with another individual playing Compete and with certainty when matched
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with an individual playing Surrender) is then
Pr[ζ|ζ,ε] ·










M∗ (1,ϕ) +M∗ (1,ϕ −∆)
2
+ (1− ζ′) ·M∗ (1,ϕ)
]
,







ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
· ζ′] ·





ζ′ |ζ′ , ε
]
(1− ζ′) ·M∗ (1,Y ) .
By continuity of these expressions in ε, a necessary condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable
against ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is that, when evaluated at ε = 0, the expression in (83) be at least as large as that
in (84). This condition writes
M∗ (1,ϕ) +M∗ (1,ϕ −∆)
2
≥ σM∗(1,Y )− σζ′
[





Since the right-hand side of this inequality attains its maximum for ζ′ = 0, a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable against any ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is that it be evolutionarily
stable against ζ′ = 0. Replacing ζ′ by 0 in the preceding inequality, I conclude that a necessary
condition for ζ = 1 to be evolutionarily stable against any ζ′ ∈ [0,1) is:
σ ≤
M∗ (1,ϕ) +M∗ (1,ϕ −∆)
2 ·M∗ (1,Y )
. (85)
By continuity of the expressions in (78) and (79) in ε (recall that the conditional probabilities are
continuous in ε), this condition is also sufficient if it holds as a strict inequality.
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